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Abstract 
Taxation is key to the character and functioning of the state, economy and society. Its 
effectiveness and the levels of compliance greatly depend on acceptance by citizens of its 
legitimacy. This paper proposes a rethinking of approaches to compliance, extending 
perspectives which view regulation as an interactive or reflexive process mediated by socio-
linguistic practices. These suggest that the meaning of rules is not fixed ex ante, but may 
emerge and change through such interactions, which therefore actually help to construct what 
it means to comply. The analysis supports proposals to base tax law on purposive general 
principles combined with detailed rules. However, it suggests that this should be the approach 
adopted for the tax code as a whole, instead of focusing mainly on the merits of a general 
anti-avoidance principle, as some of the recent debates have done. Although a general anti-
avoidance principle may have a place, the aim of achieving a cultural shift in the regulatory 
system of tax compliance needs public debates on the substantive general principles of 
taxation. These have been neglected, as tax reform initiatives have tended to become fruitless 
exercises in trying to rewrite complex tax law in plain language. Unless the tax code itself is 
built on a sound foundation of principles generally accepted as fair, compliance will be 
problematic. 
The first part of this paper explores the question of interpretation of rules and the problem of 
avoidance and game-playing. It re-examines the issue of the indeterminacy of rules and 
relocates it within the context of professional and regulatory practices, suggesting that it is 
these interactions that construct the meaning of rules and hence of compliance. In the second 
part the analysis is applied to income taxation, to sketch out how the international tax system 
has been constructed through the interaction of contending views of fairness in the allocation 
of tax jurisdiction, while in the process becoming refined into a formalist and technicist 
process of game-playing. I argue that the central factor in this process has been the inherent 
contestability of the core concepts of international taxation, the rules on corporate residence 
and source of income. The final section then considers some of the current proposals for 
improving tax compliance, in particular by reducing complexity, improving clarity, and the 
use of broad principles. 
A. THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMPLIANCE 
1. Negotiating the Meaning of Rules and Legitimacy 
Much of the discussion of `compliance’ with rules implies a rather instrumental view of law, 
in which the aim of the regulator is to induce the regulatee to comply with the requirements 
of a rule. This assumes that regulator and regulatee both have a relatively clear understanding 
of what the rules mean, and indeed a shared understanding. Although there have long been 
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jurisprudential debates about the imprecision or indeterminacy of rules,1 only relatively 
recently have some authors explored the implications of this from a socio-legal perspective 
(McBarnet & Whelan 1991, 1999, Reichman 1992, McCahery & Picciotto 1995, Black 1997, 
Braithwaite & Braithwaite 1995, Lange 1999, Braithwaite 2002).  
However, even socio-legal studies tend to assume that there is basic agreement on the 
meaning of the `core’ of the rules, and that any ambiguity lies in the `penumbra’, or the `grey 
areas’. Regulatees are generally seen as being on a continuum between the committed or 
compliant at one end, and at the other the avoiders or evaders, those who enjoy game-playing 
or like to `play for the grey’. Avoidance also tends to be seen as involving `creative 
compliance’, complying with the letter while avoiding the spirit or policy of the law 
(McBarnet 2003: 229). This again implies that those involved share a common understanding 
of the requirements of the rules. However, Valerie Braithwaite has recently asked the 
question `What Does it Mean to Comply?’ She suggests that it is not always easy to assess 
whether a person has done `what is asked of him or her’, and that `whether or not a person 
interprets the request in accordance with its intent is far from certain’ (V. Braithwaite 2003a: 
276). This implies a different view, in which various players may have different and 
genuinely-held understandings of a rule’s meaning, and may each consider theirs the correct 
and clear meaning. 
Indeed, the existence of different understandings or interpretations of `what is required’ by a 
rule is, I suggest, a frequent and even normal situation. Let us take a basic tax provision, such 
as what deductions are allowable against employment income. Even a cursory piece of 
research would show, I think, that taxpayers have very different understandings of `what is 
asked’ of them by this rule.2 This may of course be due to a variety of factors, not least that 
few people are enthusiastic about reading tax legislation. It must nevertheless be a concern 
for any regulatory regime, and to researchers studying compliance with it, if there can be 
different understandings or interpretations of the rules to which its subjects are expected to 
adhere. It may mean, for example, that people who regard themselves as compliant, based on 
their understanding of the regulatory requirements, may from the regulator’s viewpoint be 
avoiders or game-players.  
This suggests that the primary task in designing a regulatory system is to build it on 
principles which are widely accepted as fair and hence help foster shared understandings. The 
instrumental view of law generally considers that compliance is best achieved by formulating 
law in clear language and using precise or specific rules rather than more abstract general 
principles. This view has been undermined by critiques, based in linguistic philosophy, which 
point to the indeterminacy of law. Socio-legal studies generate a separate concern, that 
instrumentalism takes a uni-directional view of compliance with law, which fails to take 
account of the ability of legal subjects to adapt their behaviour in response to the law and to 
its application by those responsible for its enforcement.  
This opens a further perspective, that norms may be generated and derive their meaning 
through the interactions of all those involved in a social field. This has been examined in 
Bettina Lange’s fascinating fine-grained study of waste disposal regulation, looking 
especially at the interaction between formal and informal rules (Lange 1999). The critique of 
indeterminacy and the view of law as a social process are inter-related in studies of regulation 
which view it as mediated by interpretive practices. This is captured by the term regulatory 
conversations, which has been developed by Julia Black as a metaphor for the analysis of the 
socio-cultural interactions between regulators and regulatees (Black 1997, 1998, 2002). 
However, this raises the question of whether esoteric conversational communities may 
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develop complex regulatory fields, insulating them from input from outsiders and broader 
democratic debate. Indeed, the issue of indeterminacy and formalism is fundamentally about 
democracy, since it concerns the processes for generating the authoritative meaning of laws. 
2. Legitimacy in Tax Compliance and Avoidance 
The problem of legitimacy of income taxation has been a key factor in the crisis of the 
Keynesian fiscal state since the mid-1970s. In many countries wage-earners became 
increasingly reluctant to accept tax burdens which they perceived as inequitable, especially 
due to the greater effectiveness of collection at source from employment income, compared 
with the greater opportunities for avoidance available for income from capital, business or 
self-employment. On the other hand, it has been argued that tax burdens on business or on 
high earnings hinder entrepreneurship and discourage achievement, and in a world of mobile 
money governments have generally preferred to try to boost revenues through economic 
expansion rather than increasing taxation of investment income. The pressures on income 
taxation have led to widespread reforms in many countries both of tax policy and 
administration. Policy reforms have generally entailed reducing high marginal rates of 
income tax while attempting to broaden the tax base by ending tax breaks and combating 
avoidance, as well as widening the tax net by introducing new sources of revenue such as 
sales and transaction taxes.  
Unfortunately, the attempts at structural reform of income tax have largely failed. Although 
the virtues of tax `neutrality’ have often been extolled, in practice tax provisions have been 
extensively used for political and social engineering purposes. This produces an ever-growing 
volume of tax law, including complex amendments to prevent the use of tax breaks in 
unintended ways. In the absence of structural reform, the attention has shifted to improving 
tax administration, involving new managerial techniques and professionalisation, with 
revenue authorities often being given greater autonomy from government, although within a 
defined remit. As with other areas of governance in the `new regulatory state’3 there has been 
a shift to a culture of service delivery, with corporate plans, customer charters, and 
performance targets (Hamilton 2003). The aim is to rebuild the confidence and trust of 
citizens in public services, mainly through technocratic approaches to efficiency. However, as 
tax administrations are being asked to do more with fewer resources (to achieve `efficiency 
gains’), there has not surprisingly been talk of a crisis in tax administration (Aaron & 
Slemrod 2004: 2-4).  
The new approach to regulation entails new relationships between the so-called public and 
private spheres which are more diverse and interactive, or `reflexive’. An important feature of 
governance in the regulatory state is reliance on formalised rules, which increasingly replace 
informal norms or shared understandings amongst closed groups. At the same time, the 
increased complexity of regulatory interactions has also brought a new awareness of the 
inadequacy of instrumental views of law and regulation. Taxation has features in common 
with other areas of economic regulation, but its particular character means that some of them 
are present in a much more extreme form. This is especially so for two key features of 
modern tax systems, which are in many ways related. The first is their complexity, and the 
second is the prevalence of tax avoidance, especially when it develops to the point where it 
becomes an elaborate `game’ between tax officials and the tax `planning’ industry.  
Legal complexity comes from the attempt to draw up rules which are precise and which 
anticipate every contingency, resulting in a highly complex tax code. This derives from 
formalism:` a narrow approach to legal control - the use of clearly defined, highly 
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administrable rules, and an emphasis on uniformity, consistency and predicatibility, on the 
legal form of transactions and relationships and on literal interpretation.' (McBarnet & 
Whelan 1991: 849). The alternative is more general, open-ended principles which focus on 
substance rather than form, and are expressed purposively or in policy-oriented terms. 
However, this comes up against a problem endemic in liberal legality, often referred to as 
indeterminacy: that general legal rules are open to different possible interpretations. `[L]aw in 
itself is complex and elusive, open to different interpretations: its application to specific facts, 
even more so' (McBarnet & Whelan 1999: 217). It is to avoid the uncertainty created by 
broad principles that regulators seek precision in detailed rules.  
However, the formalist approach does not prevent avoidance, but shifts it to a new level, 
involving game-playing and `creative compliance’. This has been pointed out especially by 
Doreen McBarnet and her collaborators in studies of avoidance both of tax and financial 
regulation. She has described `creative compliance’ as `working to rule’ (McBarnet 2003). 
Essentially, it entails recharacterising the legal form of economic transactions, in such a way 
as to avoid the purpose of the law while complying with the letter of the rule. Hence, as 
several commentators have pointed out, the complexity resulting from formalism also 
generates uncertainty (Miller 1993; Weisbach 1999; J. Braithwaite 2002, 2003a), especially if 
it results from cat-and-mouse game-playing, which generates `contrived complexity’ (J. 
Braithwaite 2003a, 76). Thus, as John Braithwaite has recently argued, it may be better to 
combine general principles and specific rules (J. Braithwaite 2002, 2003a, 2005).  
This paper argues a slightly different view of creative compliance, built on the insight that 
alternative interpretations of rules may each be potentially valid. Hence, a regulatory regime 
may be `created’ through the interactions of those involved, mediated by contestations about 
the validity and legitimacy of different interpretations of rules. To consider this more closely, 
it is important first to try to clarify the issue of indeterminacy. 
3. Three Levels of Indeterminacy of Rules 
I suggest that there are three aspects or levels of indeterminacy. At the most general level, 
indeterminacy arises from the social nature of language. At least since Wittgenstein, 
linguistic philosophy has emphasised that the meaning of words is socially constructed. 
Hence, even physical objects have an ontological existence which depends on shared 
understandings and practices, reflected in the terms used to denote them within a particular 
linguistic group or community. Furthermore, linguistic terms also carry a range of social 
connotations, for example about the normal or socially acceptable uses of an object. Thus, for 
example, specific terms may be used to denote an umbrella and a parasol because they are 
generally used for different purposes, although they are very similar objects and in practice 
may be substitutable. The implications of the social construction of meaning are clearly much 
greater for terms or statements which do not refer to sensorily verifiable objects or events, but 
to social activities, and even more to artificial concepts.4 Thus, it has been suggested that 
income tax law is different in kind even from other laws (even other taxes, such as sales or 
transaction taxes), because its concepts do not refer to something which exists in nature.5 This 
point is well taken for the central concept of income, which is almost entirely artificial, 
although I suggest that a concept such as residence does have some relation to physical 
reality, at least as much as does that of an exchange transaction. Thus, there is less 
indeterminacy in a drunk-driving law that refers to blood-alcohol levels (although that still 
depends on the social practices, e.g. of their measurement), than one which refers to capacity 
to drive (Endicott 2001). 
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There are two further levels of indeterminacy of legal or regulatory rules, due to their nature 
as norms in a liberal system of regulation. Liberal legality assumes that individuals should be 
free to decide on their own conduct provided it complies with rules of law expressed in 
general terms addressed to all citizens. Regulation may involve other kinds of decision-
making process, such as a requirement of prior approval, which obviously provides more 
certainty.6 However, such a power is regarded as absolutist and illegitimate unless it is 
subject to procedural safeguards, and exercised within a framework of rules. Nevertheless, 
the liberal principle of individual freedom subject to the rule of law gives rise to a range of 
positions in political theory on whether it is best safeguarded by laws expressed in general 
principles or precise rules (J. Braithwaite 2002: 49). At one end of the spectrum is the 
assumption that the freedom of citizens is best safeguarded by ensuring that state power is 
exercised only through rules drawn as precisely and specifically as possible, and at the other 
the view that law `must allow forms of private ordering, giving legal powers to individuals to 
create and to assume rights and duties in ways that are liable to be vague' (Endicott 2001: 
382). 
General norms require a process of inductive-deductive reasoning, from the particular to the 
general and vice versa. This gives rise to the second level of indeterminacy, the one with 
which lawyers are perhaps most familiar, since it is recognisable even from a positivist 
perspective on legal rules. Its most well-known exposition is in H. L. A. Hart’s discussion of 
the core meaning and the `penumbra’ of legal rules (Hart 1958). This suggests that the 
broader a legal rule the more fuzzy its core and the wider the penumbra. It also implies that 
all rules have an objective meaning at their core that is generally understood, and that it is 
only the more or less marginal cases in the penumbra that may be doubtful. 
However, applying to norms the interpretive approach to language (the first level of 
indeterminacy mentioned above) suggests a third level of indeterminacy. Fuller’s famous 
critique of Hart (Fuller 1958) was essentially based on the view that legal precepts are not 
merely positivist statements of a general character but norms, so that interpreting their 
meaning when applying them to particular cases entails a normative judgement. Thus, 
deciding whether a particular instance fits within a general principle is not just a factual 
inquiry but entails a value-judgement, if it concerns a legal principle. Fuller argued that this is 
not limited to the `penumbra’ of borderline or doubtful cases, but that every application of a 
general rule to a particular case involves purposive interpretation. He argued for a view of 
`fidelity to the law’ which would `accept the broader responsibilities (themselves purposive, 
as all responsibilities are and must be) that go with a purposive interpretation of law’ (Fuller 
1958: 670).  
The implication of this is that even the core meaning of a legal norm depends on a shared 
view of the values or purposes which underlie it. Differing views about those values will 
result in different interpretations of the meaning of the norm, which are equally potentially 
acceptable. Fuller’s concern was with the responsibility of judges in applying legal rules. For 
him, the judges’ responsibility in interpreting laws included a responsibility to uphold certain 
core values of what law should be, and not simply applying the law `as it is’.  
The Hart-Fuller debate centred on the relationship between law and morality, in that Fuller 
argued that the meaning given to a legal rule is inseparable from the moral values it is 
considered to embody, whereas Hart’s essentially formalist view was that legal and moral 
reasoning could (and should) be separated. I suggest that a more helpful view comes from an 
understanding that epistemology is relative and based on different social practices, which 
nevertheless interact within society as a whole. The problem of formalism comes from a type 
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of reasoning that assumes that social behaviour can be comprehended in terms of the internal 
rationality of a particular social practice (law, morality, economics, science) without 
reference to other perspectives.  
This is exemplified in legal adjudication by the literal approach to rules, which asserts that 
they should be understood according to their `natural’, `ordinary’, or `normal’ meaning, in 
their `context’, which generally means the linguistic context of the particular words. This 
implies that the legal meaning can be directly related to common social practices and 
understandings (unless the term itself is recognised as deriving from a particular technical 
sphere). From this perspective, the moral (or economic, or political) purpose of a rule is 
irrelevant in understanding its meaning. The literal approach to interpretation is generally 
contrasted with the purposive approach, which suggests that the specific words of a 
legislative provision should be interpreted in accordance with the general purpose of the 
legislation. This goes some way towards cognitive openness, in that it obliges the interpreter 
of the rule (usually a judge) to articulate the policy implications of the possible interpretations 
of the rule, and to select among them by reference to the objectives of the legislature. In the 
UK the courts have historically preferred the literal approach, especially in tax cases, 
although there has been some shift recently towards purposiveness (Avery Jones 1996).  
To the extent that there are shared understandings among the various practitioners involved in 
the law, the indeterminacy of the rules may be greatly reduced, but only within that closed 
group. If a legal rule refers to a more widely understood or experienced ontologically 
verifiable object, or even a common social activity, indeterminacy may also be reduced. 
However, legal reasoning which remains closed to wider social practices and understandings 
relies for its legitimacy simply on the authority of lawyers as technical specialists. A wider, 
and indeed more democratic, legitimacy comes from adopting a more open epistemology, 
which acknowledges that legal rules have a wider social resonance and impact, and that their 
understanding must be informed by wider social practices, especially those of the persons to 
whom they are addressed. This is likely to be important to the legitimacy and hence stability 
of an interactive regulatory process or system. 
4. Constructing Compliance 
Looking more broadly at regulatory systems as social processes, we can say that 
interpretative judgements are made about rules or regulations by all those involved: by those 
who are expected to comply with the regulation, the specialists who they may consult for 
advice about it, and the officials tasked with monitoring compliance. Each person’s 
understanding of a regulation will to some extent depend on what they think it should mean, 
and this will affect how far they are willing to accept what another person thinks it means. 
Their interactions involve negotiations about these meanings, `regulatory conversations’ to 
use Black’s term, which in one way or another may result in shared understandings about the 
meaning of the rules. How far they do so, however, greatly depends on a shared acceptance 
of the values or purposes which underlie them, since they are by their nature normative. 
Hence, `constructing compliance’ with a regulation entails more than persuading those who 
are subject to it to ensure that their conduct complies with the regulation. It entails 
constructing a shared view of what the regulation itself means. A stable and effective 
regulatory system therefore is one in which such acceptance is as broad as possible. This will 
minimise the extent of disagreement or contestation about the meaning of the regulations.  
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The points made above about the indeterminacy of rules, should also be considered in terms 
of the sociological analysis of fields of regulation. As Mark Tushnet has pointed out, the 
indeterminacy thesis is not simply an argument in analytic jurisprudence, but one of political 
or social theory (Tushnet 1996: 339). The `construction’ of a regulatory field is a social 
process, mediated by interpretative practices. Thus, Pierre Bourdieu has discussed the 
practices of interpretation of legal texts, involving the appropriation of the `symbolic power 
which is potentially contained within the text’, in terms of competitive struggles to `control’ 
the legal text (Bourdieu 1987: 818). However, he suggests that coherence emerges partly 
through the social organization of the field, and partly because to succeed competing 
interpretations must be presented `as the necessary result of a principled interpretation of 
unanimously accepted texts’ (ibid. ). This explains the apparent paradox that, while lawyers 
spend much of their time disagreeing about the meaning of texts, they often do so from an 
objectivist perspective. They generally deny that indeterminacy is inherent, and tend to 
attribute disagreements to bad drafting and lack of clarity in the texts, which are said to create 
`loopholes’ in the logical fabric of the law, although it is legal arguments that generate the 
loopholes as well as constituting the warp and weft of law.  
Finally, we should remember that legal and regulatory practices operate upon and in the 
context of the overall social fields which they help to regularise. Thus, while Bourdieu points 
to `the relatively autonomous creative capacity of the law which the existence of its 
specialized field of production makes possible’, he stresses that `[t]he shaping of practices 
through juridical formalisation can succeed only to the extent that legal organisation gives 
explicit form to a tendency already immanent within those practices’, since ` [t]he rules 
which succeed are those which, as we say, regularise factual situations consonant with them’ 
(Bourdieu 1987, 848-9).  
The important point here is that contestation of the meaning of norms is generated from 
disagreements about what they should mean, for the social practices which they seek to 
regulate or `regularise’. The parties may not know that they do not have a shared 
understanding; or some or all of them may realise that different views exist, and may seek to 
advance their own view as the correct one. Hence it may be a misnomer to describe such 
contests as `game-playing’. A game generally relies on a very strong shared understanding 
between the players of the purpose and meaning of the rules. Thus, the term `game-playing’ 
implies an instrumental view of rules, rather than an interpretive view.  
B. CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
1. Contested Norms in International Taxation 
The taxation of income or profit from international business is a field which has become 
increasingly complex, and rife with avoidance game-playing, especially in recent years. 
However, its basic principles were the subject of some debate from the earliest days when 
income tax began to replace indirect taxation, especially import duties, to become the centre-
piece of the fiscal constitution of the 20th century welfare-warfare state, in which Britain led 
the way (Daunton 2001). From the viewpoint of the British state, fairness required taxation of 
residents on their income from all sources, and of non-residents on income from UK sources. 
When incorporation began to be more widely used in the last part of the 19th century, it 
became necessary to interpret the application of these provisions to those companies formed 
in the UK whose activities largely took place abroad. From the 1870s on, decisions taken by 
the Inland Revenue on these matters were resisted by some companies, and ultimately 
referred for authoritative decisions by the courts. The issues were, when should a company be 
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regarded as `resident’ in the UK, and what income should be regarded as attributable to a 
company, as well as how to characterize such income (due to the schedular structure of the 
UK income tax).7  
On the question of `residence’, the decisive precedent was set by the case involving the De 
Beers mining company, which was formed under South African law; not only that, but the 
head office and all the mining activities of the company were at Kimberley, and the general 
meetings were held there. Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that the company was a 
British resident, since `the directors' meetings in London are the meetings where the real 
control is always exercised in practically all the important business of the company except the 
mining operations’(De Beers 1906: 213). In the way of English judges, this decision was put 
forward as flowing from a common-sense interpretation of the term `resident’. The Lord 
Chancellor stated: `In applying the conception of residence to a Company, we ought, I think, 
to proceed as nearly as we can upon the analogy of an individual. A Company cannot eat or 
sleep, but it can keep house and do business. We ought, therefore, to see where it really keeps 
house and does business. An individual may be of foreign nationality, and yet reside in the 
United Kingdom. So may a Company.’ (Ibid. 212-3). 
In deciding that company residence depended on the location of its main shareholders, this 
reasoning ignored or overlooked the implications for the way global business was organised 
and financed. Some of the earlier court decisions had at least appreciated the implications of 
the issue for Britain as the world’s leading source of international investment at the time. 
Thus, in 1876 Chief Baron Kelly showed an acute awareness that the cases involved `the 
international law of the world’, since many of the shareholders were foreign residents, so that 
much of the earnings of the company belonged to individuals not living in Britain and 
therefore `not within the jurisdiction of its laws’. However, he contented himself with the 
thought that if such foreigners chose to place their money in British companies, they `must 
pay the cost of it’ (Calcutta Jute 1876: 88). 
The issue looked very different from the viewpoint of some of the leaders of British 
international business. This was expressed perhaps most clearly by Sir William Vestey, who 
was to become well-known in UK tax law, and whose grocers’ firm had grown by importing 
eggs from China and beef from Argentina. He argued for fairness in relation to his 
international competitors, and proposed a global approach based on the proportion of sales in 
each country. 
`In a business of this nature you cannot say how much is made in one country and 
how much is made in another. You kill an animal and the product of that animal is 
sold in 50 different countries. You cannot say how much is made in England and how 
much is made abroad. That is why I suggest that you should pay a turnover tax on 
what is brought into this country. ... It is not my object to escape payment of tax. My 
object is to get equality of taxation with the foreigner, and nothing else.’8 
However, the British state was reluctant to modify its claim to tax all British residents (and 
companies based in the UK) on all their income, except by international agreement, which 
would take some time. Meantime, the Revenue was left to trying to apply the principle of 
residence based on the test of `central management and control’ laid down by the courts. The 
decision in De Beers rejected the alternative test, put forward on behalf of the company, of 
the place of incorporation, on the grounds that this could easily be avoided `by the simple 
expedient of being registered abroad and distributing its dividends abroad’ (De Beers 1906: 
213). But the control test could also be avoided: indeed the Vestey group had moved its 
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headquarters to Argentina in 1915 to avoid being taxed at British wartime rates on its 
worldwide business. Sir William had said he would like to come back to Britain to live work 
and die; but as his tax proposals were not accepted, not surprisingly, the Vesteys (and other 
firms) took steps to organise their affairs to ensure that they were not, as they saw it, unfairly 
subjected to tax. This involved ensuring that their foreign business was carried out by entities 
which could not be said to be resident in the UK. Indeed, they went further, and with the help 
of tax advisers, set up a scheme centred on a trust formed in Paris, which could receive 
profits from their global business and make payments to members of the Vestey family at the 
discretion of the trustees (Knightley 1993). When the Revenue eventually discovered this, it 
secured legislation in 1936-8 to tax the income of such foreign trusts. But to be effective, this 
extended to all such `sheltered’ income, even if not paid over to a UK-resident beneficiary, 
giving the Revenue very broad discretionary powers, which was later denounced by an 
eminent tax lawyer as `preposterous’ and amounting to a `suspension of the rule of law’ 
(Sumption 1982: 116, 138). The validity of these provisions, as well as subsequent legislative 
amendments, occupied lawyers and the courts profitably for many years. Indeed, the Vesteys 
scored two significant victories, although they had to take their cases to the House of Lords, 
and the judges at various levels disagreed with each other. In the hundreds of pages of 
judicial reasoning it is hard to discern any issues of principle, and the decisions turned on 
points such as whether the beneficiaries could be said to have a `power to enjoy’ income 
(Vestey's Executors 1949: 69), whether a reference to a person could include more than one 
beneficiary (ibid.), and whether the provisions could extend to beneficiaries other than the 
original transferor of the assets (Vestey 1979). 
Thus, the `game’ of international tax avoidance was born early in the 20th century, out of 
disputes over the fairness of the basis for taxation of international business income. These 
different perspectives could be used to justify different interpretations of the basic principles 
such as `residence’ and `source’ of income. International coordination did develop, although 
only slowly. However, the tax specialists who tackled the issue rejected a global approach 
along the lines suggested by William Vestey, because they considered that it would not be 
possible to reach political agreement among states, especially on the formula for allocating 
global income (Picciotto 1992: 27-37). Instead, a network of bilateral tax treaties grew, based 
on internationally agreed models, which allocated rights to tax based on residence and source. 
This entailed treating activities which from a business perspective might be globally 
integrated as if they were carried out by separate unrelated entities.  
Creative Jurisdictionality 
Although this process was in some respects one of cat-and-mouse game-playing, I suggest 
that to see it only in this way is a mischaracterization. The various interactions between the 
tax authorities and the professional advisers of internationally-operating businesses over a 
long period of time helped to construct the international tax system. Thus, the claim to tax the 
worldwide profit of residents was mitigated by the introduction of foreign tax credit 
arrangements. However, this still meant that profits earned abroad in a low-tax country could 
be subject to the higher rate of tax of the country of residence of the investor, which was 
considered unfair by transnational corporations (TNCs). Hence, they developed more 
sophisticated versions of many of the devices pioneered by wealthy families such as the 
Vesteys, by establishing affiliates incorporated in convenient jurisdictions to shelter such 
foreign-source income, enabling retained earnings to benefit from a lower tax rate. Many 
went further and used such intermediaries as channels to provide financial or service 
functions for the corporate group, enabling them to reduce the taxable profits of operating 
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affiliates by deductions of interest charges, management fees, royalties for intellectual 
property, or insurance premiums. Such schemes were of more dubious legitimacy, depending 
on the acceptability of the claim that the functions are validly carried out by separate entities 
and actually in those locations, if the companies exist in effect only on paper.  
To combat such devices, most developed countries enacted anti-avoidance legislation: for 
example, to bring `captive’ affiliates within residence rules, by treating the income of 
`controlled foreign corporations’ (CFCs) as attributable to their parent companies. However, 
the requirement of `control’ for CFCs must be defined, often by complex rules, and the 
attributable income is generally limited to `passive’ investment income. This accepts that 
some group functions or services can be provided to other parts of the TNC if they may 
arguably be said to be carried out `offshore’ (and hence produce `active’ income), such as 
shipping management, or insurance and other financial services. The jurisdictions of 
convenience, or tax havens, have therefore been further transformed into `offshore financial 
centres’. They have crafted special laws, often on the advice of specialists in corporate tax 
planning, which take advantage of the room for interpretation in other countries’ legislation. 
Thus international tax avoidance, or `planning’, has become a complex field centring on the 
negotiation of the legitimacy and validity of business and financial arrangements in an 
increasingly complex maze of different national rules and their interactions. What constitutes 
compliance continues to be negotiated. The underlying reason is the inherent contestability of 
the principle of jurisdictional allocation based on treating the components of a global firm as 
if they were separate entities. The principle is contestable because it does not embody a 
generally accepted criterion of fairness for that allocation.  
The alternative approach of global unitary taxation of TNCs based on formula apportionment 
has sometimes been put forward, but has generally been rejected by both tax administrators 
and business representatives. Certainly such an approach would, in principle, provide a much 
sounder basis for agreement on principles which could be recognised as fair to all taxpayers 
and states. However, most international tax experts remain fearful of an open debate on such 
principles of fairness, because they consider it too difficult to achieve political agreement.9 A 
perhaps cynical view would be that they have too much intellectual capital invested in the 
complex and arcane system which has grown up historically.  
There are genuine issues and disagreements about the definition and jurisdictional allocation 
of the income from international business, which are fought out in these struggles to `control 
the text’. The problem is that these issues have become largely obscured because the lack of 
any general principle of fairness in jurisdictional allocation means that the texts are so 
complex and esoteric that they are accessible only to a small number of specialists. Even 
these experts would find it hard to explain the underlying justification for many of the rules.  
Formalism also derives from the disjuncture between the conversations about the rules which 
remain internal to tax specialists, and debate in the general public policy arena (which could 
also involve contributions from other specialists such as economists). International taxation is 
now a hot policy issue, and debates about it are conducted in language which is also highly 
contested. Terms such as `tax havens’, `harmful tax competition’, and even `passive income’ 
or `high net worth investors’ are deployed for their symbolic effects; but these contests are 
hard if not impossible to connect with the specific issues dealt with in the esoteric language 
surrounding for example the definition of `controlled foreign corporation’.  
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The result is both to impoverish the policy debate, and to cut away the political and moral 
considerations which should underpin the specialist practices of those involved with tax 
compliance. These are the structural reasons which turn a regulatory culture into one of 
game-playing. The tax avoidance `game’ is one in which the players seek to interpret the 
rules to their advantage, but in a formalist and technicist manner, that is to say by referring 
only to the apparent internal logic of the rule-system, without feeling any need to justify their 
interpretation of a rule by reference to broader considerations. Those involved may consider 
they are simply doing a professional job, but to outsiders they are acting in a cynical and 
amoral manner. The problem of formalism is due not merely to the detailed nature of the 
rules, but to their being dislocated from any justifying rationale, a generally accepted 
principle of fairness. 
C. LEGITIMACY, COMPLEXITY AND COMPLIANCE 
The preceding analysis might help to illuminate some of the current debates about how to 
improve the tax regulatory system. The general concern to improve compliance by improving 
taxpayer confidence in the fairness of the system is linked to the need to find ways to reduce 
the opportunities for avoidance, and in particular to end the cynical perspective on tax rules 
that is entailed in game-playing. The difficulty is that the complex rules have been enacted 
and seem to be needed in order to combat avoidance. Thus, although many of the leading 
common-law countries have embarked on tax simplification exercises, little progress has 
been made in reducing complexity.  
There is ample evidence that taxpayer compliance largely depends on having a favourable 
attitude towards the tax system, and in particular on considering that it is on the whole a fair 
and just system (V. Braithwaite 2003a; Rawlings 2003; V. Braithwaite 2003b). Acceptance 
of the fairness of taxation may derive from an identification with the state and a general 
confidence that its tax system treats everyone equitably. There is also evidence that such a 
generalized acceptance is undermined in a period of rapid social change, especially such as 
that experienced in recent years (termed globalisation) which has tended to dissolve the 
`imagined communities’ of nationhood. In these circumstances, tax authorities must seek 
more refined means of maintaining or re-establishing taxpayers’ confidence in the tax system 
and its integrity. An important aspect of this is certainly procedural fairness: compliance is 
more likely if taxpayers feel they have been treated respectfully, honestly and impartially 
(Murphy 2003).  
Tax Law Clarification, Simplification and Reform 
Debate in recent years has focused on tax reform and simplification as a means of restoring 
confidence in the fairness of tax systems. Many a Treasury minister has vowed to simplify 
the tax laws. Such promises have sometimes resulted in tax reviews, and occasionally even in 
reforming legislation. Some reforms achieve a degree of success, but it seems to have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the triple aims of (i) greater clarity, (ii) less complexity 
and (iii) a simpler and fairer tax structure.  
The US prioritised structural reform, and its Tax Reform Act of 1986 aimed to reduce the 
complexity of the system and not just to improve clarity. However, it has been shown that 
although it `did deliver some important simplifications’ it `did not turn the tide of growing 
complexity of the tax system’ (Slemrod 1992: 55). In contrast, Australia’s Tax Law 
Improvement Project, initiated in 1993, aimed mainly at clarification. Its first project was 
legislation to simplify the `substantiation’ rules for claiming expenses as deductions from 
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salary income, which were reduced from 19,000 to 11,000 words; however the initial 
evaluation seems uncertain whether the result was easier to understand (James & 
Wallschutzky 1997: 453, 457). A more radical approach was proposed in the paper on Tax 
Reform – not a new Tax, a New Tax System (1998); this called for an integrated tax code, 
which would `use general principles in preference to long and detailed provisions’ (p.149). 
However, the impetus for simplification was overtaken by the debates generated by major tax 
changes, notably the controversial General Sales Tax.  
In the UK, although there has been much debate about both structural reform and reduction of 
complexity, the only progress made has been on clarification. The Tax Law Rewrite project 
has laboured since 1995,10 and has resulted so far in five statutes on income tax, after which 
its attention will turn to corporation tax. Even its political progenitor admits that, although it 
could be said to have improved the quality of tax legislation, it has not reduced its quantity, 
while the annual Finance Act continues to add an enormous and uncontrollable number of 
pages of tax legislation (Howe 2001). Thus the exercise seems very like a classic case of 
repainting the Forth bridge. Its effects will not be felt outside a very small circle of tax 
lawyers, as a recent independent evaluation of one of the `clarified’ statutes confirmed that 
even accountants and in-house tax specialists rarely look at the legislation itself (MORI 
2006). 
Simplification: the Purpose of Principles and the Utility of Rules 
While structural reform is hampered by political conflicts (and economic inequalities), there 
seems little point in pursuing clarification without simplification (Owens & Hamilton 2004: 
350). This has, however, been bedevilled by the concern that simplification would endanger 
clarity by reducing certainty. More recently, discussion has centred on the relative merits of 
laws cast in terms of general principles as against detailed rules.  
Some commentators have suggested that new ways can be found to combine the advantages 
of general purposive principles with the precision of more detailed rules. Thus, John Avery 
Jones has suggested a hierarchy, with overarching purposive principles at the top, less 
detailed legislation below, and Revenue rulings to deal with specifics (Jones 1996). 
Acknowledging that this would entail a far-reaching transformation of British legal and 
regulatory culture, he expressed the hope that the catalyst might be provided by the influence 
of European Community law.11 John Braithwaite has also argued convincingly that tax law 
should be designed along these lines, with overarching binding principles supported by non-
binding detailed rules (J. Braithwaite 2003a, 2005). He emphasises in particular the need for 
a general anti-avoidance principle, in order to deter the `contrived complexity’ resulting from 
tax avoidance especially by the rich. Judith Freedman has also lent her weight to the proposal 
that a General Anti-Avoidance Principle12 should be enacted in the UK, bringing it into line 
with other countries, such as Australia and Canada (Freedman 2004).13 Instead, the UK has 
preferred to introduce administrative procedures for notification of avoidance schemes, which 
raise their own questions and tactical games over what needs to be notified. 
The analysis in this paper also supports proposals to base tax law on purposive principles 
combined with detailed rules. It would, however, seem undesirable that the first or only 
general principle should be on anti-avoidance.14 Authors such as John Braithwaite and Judith 
Freedman argue, in my view correctly, that more certainty could be provided by a tax code 
based on broad general principles, supplemented by more detailed rules which could emerge 
from regulatory conversations between tax authorities and taxpayers or their advisers. Thus, 
Freedman suggests that a general anti-avoidance rule `would facilitate a debate around the 
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meaning of the difficult concept of tax avoidance which could be pursued between the 
taxpaying community and revenue authorities’ (Freedman 2004: 357).  
However, the analysis put forward here suggests that it is essential, not optional, to begin by 
formulating general principles in the substantive areas of tax law, which should adequately 
express a widely accepted principle of fairness or equity in relation to that type of tax. A 
general anti-avoidance rule itself may not help to guide tax planners as to what is acceptable 
since, as Nabil Orow has pointed out, the complexity of the tax laws as a whole has led to the 
invention of such fantastical tax-driven financing devices that ` tax lawyers and specialists 
have lost their sense and grasp of reality’ (Orow 2004: 412). 
Tax reform should not be viewed as a technical exercise. Nor can the vicious circle of game-
playing and complexity be broken by introducing a general principle of adherence to the 
spirit of tax rules, if that spirit is not itself expressed in terms of broad and generally accepted 
principles. Regulatory conversations may not help to improve the quality of regulation if they 
are conducted only within closed circles of experts. Indeed, such specialist communities may 
generate their own esoteric language in which to negotiate interpretations of the rules. They 
may therefore remain impervious to attempts to introduce transparency by formal measures, 
such as publication of technical documents and consultation. Disagreements about the 
normative underpinnings of the rules may result in game-playing and hence complexity. Both 
specialist language and regulatory complexity may develop partly as a defence mechanism, 
through a misplaced lack of trust that public debate and political processes can help resolve 
normative conflicts. 
As this paper has shown, indeterminacy results not merely from the inherent ambiguities of 
language, but from different normative perceptions. Hence, there are real limits to what can 
be achieved merely by redrafting existing regulations. Articulating the fairness principles 
underlying tax law should clearly be part of a wider democratic deliberation, including tax 
law reform. At the same time, a shift towards discussing taxation in terms of general fairness 
principles instead of the arcane complexities of detailed rules may also make a significant 
contribution to such a democracy. 
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?  A first version of this paper was drafted during an all-too-short visit of four weeks to the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity at the Australian National University, and presented to a seminar attended by staff of the 
Australian Tax Office and the Treasury; a subsequent version was published as a CTSI Working Paper. My 
grateful thanks to John Braithwaite and all his colleagues at RegNet for the opportunity to work in such a 
stimulating and friendly environment, and more specifically to Val Braithwaite and her colleagues in the CTSI, 
especially Jenny Job and Greg Rawlings, and to ATO and Treasury staff, for all their help, comments, and 
discussions.  
1 For a recent discussion see Endicott 2001 and other papers in the same issue of the journal. 
2 I am not aware of any scientific empirical research on this question. However, I would urge any doubting 
reader to try asking any half-dozen or more friends or colleagues (as I have done), what their understanding is of 
the deduction rule. I have found qualitatively significant variations even among a group of tax researchers.  
3 Many writers have used the term or the general concept (notably Teubner 1987, Majone 1993, Pildes and 
Sunstein 1995, Loughlin 1997, Braithwaite 2000, Scott 2000), and with different actual states in mind; clearly 
the changes are far from uniform but vary greatly between different national contexts (for a recent comparative 
overview see Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004). Nor do they lead to a settled or even clearly identifiable outcome: 
indeed, Michael Moran argues that a key feature, at least of the British regulatory state, is `hyper-innovation’ 
(Moran 2003). Most recently, John Braithwaite has explicitly applied the concept to the area of tax 
administration (J. Braithwaite 2005).  
4 I should perhaps say that I adopt a critical realist perspective which posits an objectivist ontology but a 
relativist epistemology, i.e. that reality can only be understood through the different perceptions of the various 
actors involved. Thus, our shared perceptions of the natural world provide a firmer common grasp of its reality, 
understandings of social activities are likely to be more relativistic, while shared understandings of abstract 
concepts must be generated by socio-linguistic practices. 
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5 Prebble 1998: 113; prior to the emergence of the modern income tax, of course, direct taxes were levied on the 
indicia of wealth, such as windows, or carriages. 
6 For example, theatre performance was not liberalised in Britain until the requirement of prior approval of 
scripts by the Lord Chamberlain under the Stage Licensing Act of 1737 was ended in 1968. In the field of 
taxation, relative certainty is sometimes achieved by giving the tax authorities the power to determine whether a 
proposed arrangement is liable to tax, although such a determination is not usually final.  
7 Different categories of income were (and still are) taxed differently according the Schedule and Case to which 
they might be attributed; in particular income or profits of a trade were taxable as they arose, while income from 
securities or possessions were taxable only when remitted to the UK. Thus, UK shareholders of a foreign-
resident company would only be liable for UK tax on dividends remitted to the UK; whereas if the company 
itself were regarded as UK resident, its worldwide trading profits would be regarded as directly taxable in the 
UK. For further details of the court decisions and interpretations involved see Picciotto 1992, 6-8.  
8 UK Royal Commission on Income Tax, Evidence, p. 452, Question 9460. 
9 Taxation on a unitary basis has been applied by the component states in a federal system, notably in the USA; 
however, a strong campaign was waged in the 1970s and 1980s against its extension globally (Picciotto 1992: 
241-9). More recently, the European Commission has proposed taxation of business operating in the single 
European market on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (European Commission 2001); although this 
is viewed with scepticism by national Treasury officials, it has some support among business representatives 
(interview information).  
10  Its aim is `to rewrite all (or most) of the United Kingdom’s existing primary direct tax legislation to make it 
clearer and easier to use, without changing or making less certain its general effect’ see 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/rewrite/. 
11 It does seem to be the case that the problem of complexity or `hyper-lexis’ is peculiar to common-law 
countries, perhaps for a combination of reasons which there is no space to consider here. 
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12 Freedman has suggested the admittedly ugly acronym GANTIP for this, since GAAP is understood to refer to 
US accounting principles, and the alternative of GAAR which is often used runs counter to the distinction 
between general principles and specific rules. 
13 The proposal has developed into an interesting and typically British process of constitutional evolution (or 
buck-passing). The House of Lords, having appeared to take the bold step of introducing such a principle in its 
decisions in Ramsay (1982) and Furniss (1984), has now recast it as a principle of purposive interpretation, 
since it does not consider itself to have the constitutional power to introduce a general overarching interpretative 
principle (MacNiven 2003). Meantime, the government declined to put a proposal for such a general principle to 
the legislature (apparently bowing to business pressures), but has instead introduced a procedure requiring 
notification to the Revenue of new tax planning devices; the statutory power for this is drafted in impossibly 
wide terms, so its effectiveness will depend on the more detailed regulatory requirements, which have been 
more narrowly drafted (Richards 2004). It has been suggested that there is no need for a legislated anti-
avoidance principle, as sufficient resources are available in the common law (Simpson 2004); while the judicial 
shift to purposive interpretation of existing tax law without a legislated anti-avoidance principle is likely to 
favour the taxpayer (Tiley 2004). 
14 Anti-avoidance principles (or the requirement to show a commercial justification rather than a tax-reduction 
motive) are already present in specific parts of UK tax law, and have been shown to operate with `reasonable 
objectivity’ (Kessler 2004). This supports the view that it is the particular parts of tax law that need to be drafted 
in terms of purposive principles. 
